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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3771 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
HIKEEM TORRENCE,  
a/k/a HAK 
 
     Hikeem Torrence, 
                     Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-13) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2015 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 11, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Hikeem Torrence appeals his conviction and sentence in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on his participation in a large-scale 
drug-trafficking enterprise known as the “Harlem Boys” that operated in the Bartram 
Village Housing Development (“Bartram Village”) in Philadelphia.  On appeal, he raises 
three grounds of alleged error.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.    
I. Background 
 The pertinent factual background surrounding the Harlem Boys drug-trafficking 
operation is set forth more fully in the opinion addressing the appeal of co-conspirator 
Ramel Moten.  See United States v. Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. May 11, 
2015).  We provide here only the facts relevant to Torrence’s appeal. 
 Torrence was named along with nineteen other defendants in an eighty-nine count 
superseding indictment.  Specifically, he was charged with conspiracy to participate in a 
racketeering enterprise (count 1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); conspiracy to 
distribute 280 grams of cocaine base (crack) and marijuana (count 2), in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) 
(count 75), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); assault with a deadly 
weapon in aid of racketeering, and aiding and abetting (count 82), in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1959(a)(4); carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence, and aiding 
and abetting (counts 83, 85, and 87), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); attempted murder 
in aid of racketeering, and aiding and abetting (count 84), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 1959(a)(5); and assault with a deadly weapon in aid of racketeering, and aiding and 
abetting (count 86), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3).   
 Torrence was acquitted of one of the counts of assault with a deadly weapon and 
of the accompanying firearm charge (counts 86 and 87), but was convicted on all other 
counts in which he was named.  The District Court sentenced him to 564 months’ 
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release and imposed various fines and special 
assessments.   
II. Discussion1  
 Torrence raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred in 
refusing to suppress evidence obtained during an allegedly invalid Terry stop; (2) 
whether the District Court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude testimony that 
he was arrested while police were responding to a report of a person with a gun; and (3) 
whether the District Court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude recorded 
conversations between a confidential informant and Moten.  None of his arguments is 
persuasive.2  
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 2 In his statement of the issues, Torrence lists three issues for appeal that are 
different from the three issues he actually discusses in his brief and that do not appear to 
be in relation to this case.  We assume that this was merely a clerical mistake but, insofar 
as it was not, those three issues are waived.  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 
(3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 8, 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to 
identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 
appeal.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8).   
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 A. Suppression of Evidence3   
 On June 2, 2010, Philadelphia police officers responded to a radio call reporting a 
“person with a gun” at 5405 Bartram Drive.  (Supp. App. at 416.)  Upon arrival, the 
officers located spent shell casings on the steps of that address.  After a bystander told 
police that the gunman ran into one of the apartments at 5401 Harley Terrace, the officers 
began knocking on doors there.  When police knocked on the door of Apartment 3B, 
Torrence came “bolting” out of that apartment – almost knocking an officer to the 
ground.  (Supp. App. at 379.)  As one of the officers struggled to detain Torrence, 
Torrence open his clenched hand and dropped a small item onto the windowsill.  The 
other officer recovered the item, which was a bag containing several small packets of 
crack cocaine.   
 Torrence claims that the evidence should have been suppressed because the stop 
was without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  We disagree.  The officers had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Torrence when, in response to the police knocking on the 
door and announcing their presence, he ran out of the apartment where a gunman was 
reported to be.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 124 (2000) (“[A]n officer 
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. ... [N]ervous, 
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” (internal 
                                              
 3 We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to 
the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review of its application of the law to 
those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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quotation marks omitted)); Cf. United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“[W]e conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion [to detain and frisk the 
defendant] after they received the face-to-face tip, were in a high-crime area at 1:00 a.m., 
and saw [the defendant] and his two companions walk away as soon as they noticed the 
police car.”).  Accordingly, Torrence’s detention was a valid Terry stop and, because they 
were responding to a radio call of a person with a gun, the officers had sufficient cause to 
believe Torrence was armed and dangerous and were thus permitted to conduct a limited 
search of his person for weapons.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that an 
officer may conduct “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police 
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual”).  The seizure of the crack cocaine, whether obtained as a result of Torrence’s 
abandonment or a constitutionally permissible pat-down conducted pursuant to a valid 
Terry stop, was thus reasonable and the District Court did not err in denying Torrence’s 
motion to suppress.  See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (police 
officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective pat-down 
search of the sort permitted by Terry); United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 652, 654-
55 (3d Cir. 1993) (crack cocaine that defendant abandoned while in flight from the DEA 
agent was properly admitted during valid Terry stop). 
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 B.  Introduction of Evidence of Prior Shooting4  
 Torrence also complains that, in explaining why the police officers stopped him 
during the June 2, 2010 incident, the jury was allowed to hear that the officers were 
responding to a radio call for a shooting.  He argues that he was not charged with gun 
possession, nor was it listed as an overt act in the conspiracy, and therefore admitting that 
testimony was unduly prejudicial.  Again, we disagree. 
 As Torrence acknowledges, the jury was told that the police were responding to a 
radio call for a shooting to explain why they were present in Bartram Village on the night 
in question.  The evidence that the police were responding to a radio call was relevant to 
provide context to the jury and was, at most, prejudicial in that it showed that Torrence 
was present in an area where crime and gun violence were common.5  We cannot say that 
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the contextual relevance of the 
evidence.  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
                                              
 4 We review the District Court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 
 5 The District Court’s opinion and the government’s brief tend to focus on whether 
it was permissible for the government to introduce evidence through the testimony of 
cooperating co-conspirators that, in furtherance of the RICO enterprise, Torrence actually 
did shoot a rival drug dealer on June 2.  Torrence’s argument on this point, however, is 
not as to that testimony, but is limited to the police testimony regarding their June 2 stop.  
Nonetheless, as we discuss below, evidence that Torrence shot a rival drug dealer was 
relevant to the charged RICO offenses.  
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 C.  Introduction of Recorded Conversations Between Co-Conspirators6 
 Finally, Torrence argues that the District Court should have excluded two recorded 
conversations between Moten and a confidential informant that reference “Hak” –
Torrence’s alias – shooting a rival drug dealer on June 2.  Torrence contends that the 
conversations were irrelevant, hearsay, and unduly prejudicial.7  
 First, evidence from co-conspirators that Torrence actually shot at a competing 
drug dealer – ultimately missing his intended target – was direct evidence of his 
participation in the Harlem Boys’ enterprise and was thus intrinsic to the charged 
offenses.  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010) (evidence of 
uncharged misconduct is admissible if it “directly proves” the charged offense or if the 
misconduct was contemporaneous with the charged crime and facilitated its commission).  
Second, the recording was not hearsay because it was plainly a statement made by a co-
conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.  See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  
                                              
 6 As we have noted, we review the District Court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse 
of discretion.  Brennan, 326 F.3d at 182.   
 
 7 One of the conversations that Torrence complains about is the following 
exchange: 
  
Moten: I don’t know what you heard but I just need my bread.  This shit 
crazy.  It’s all Hak’s fault.  
Confidential Informant: It’s Hak’s fault? Oh, he done put him on a mission. 
  
(Torrence App. at 700; App. at 5114.)  This largely incomprehensible exchange falls in 
the middle of a larger discussion about how one of the Harlem Boys obtained a gun that 
he used during a robbery.  Torrence is mentioned by his alias in passing during that 
discussion and his attorney immediately made that point clear during cross examination, 
when he prompted the agent to explain that Torrence had nothing to do with either the 
gun or the robbery.  Accordingly, this conversation was not prejudicial to Torrence and 
was relevant to the purpose for which it was admitted.  
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Finally, even though the testimony as to the uncharged misconduct is prejudicial, its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 403.   
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the rulings of the District Court. 
